OIOS Evaluation Report is Highly Critical of UN's Approach to Sexual Offenses by its Own Personnel
June 8, 2021: A UN report published earlier this year has delivered a blunt assessment of the UN’s response to sexual offenses committed by its own personnel, an assessment that echoes critiques leveled by the Code Blue Campaign.
The report—completed by the Inspection and Evaluation Division of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS)—was little noticed when it was released in April. The UN did not hold a press conference to herald its findings. And it’s no wonder. The report is a damning account of the failures of the UN’s response to allegations over a three-year period (2015 to 2018) and a brutal indictment of the core elements of Secretary-General António Guterres’ “New Approach” to the crisis. It reveals an institution signally unable to cope with a crisis of its own making.
We review the key findings of the report below:
1) Lack of criminal accountability for sex crimes committed by civilians
From the report:
The report states: “Criminal accountability for sex crimes remained largely unachieved with some success regarding uniformed personnel but none regarding civilians and experts on mission.”
“There were multiple reasons for the lack of criminal accountability,” the report goes on. “Member States reported that they lacked extraterritorial jurisdiction and other challenges related to availability of resources, competing priorities and cooperation between States.”
Our response:
When a civilian working under the UN flag is accused of sexual abuse, the UN conducts an internal fact-finding investigation and, if warranted, is empowered to fire or fine the perpetrator. The UN cannot undertake a criminal investigation, file criminal charges, or prosecute the accused. If the UN’s administrative investigation determines that (a) the alleged offense is a crime, and (b) the accused could have committed it, UN immunity does not apply and government authorities are free to conduct a criminal investigation and prosecute if warranted. At least, that’s how the process is supposed to happen.
When any other individual is accused of committing a crime in a foreign country, the government of that country has the right and the obligation to pursue criminal justice. But UN leadership has—behind closed doors and in an ad hoc manner—deemed certain countries incapable of investigating and prosecuting their personnel. We were informed verbally by Jane Holl Lute, the UN’s Special Coordinator on Improving the United Nations Response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, that it would be inhumane for the UN to “throw staff to the wolves” if the countries in which they’ve been accused of crimes have law enforcement or judicial systems that are considered substandard. At the same time, the evidence shows that the UN cannot rely on states of nationality to prosecute their accused nationals through the means of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Even the United Kingdom, which has the laws (and resources) to prosecute child rape cases committed in other countries, decided not to initiate a criminal investigation when presented with an actionable case against a UN official of British nationality.
From the report:
“Criminal accountability for crimes of SEA (e.g. rape, sexual activity with a minor and sexual assault) for UN officials and experts on mission through UN referral was mostly unsuccessful. Out of the 33 such referrals made by the UN during 2008-2019, only in one case was criminal proceedings initiated by the relevant Member State and the case was expected to go to trial.”
“There has been no case resulting in a criminal sanction for these referred cases.”
Our response:
Our research shows that only a small percentage of cases involving criminal sexual offenses received by the UN are referred to Member States for investigation and prosecution. Moreover, the total number of sex crime allegations involving civilian personnel is far higher than those involving military personnel.
From the UN’s available data, we know that:
The UN received at least 114 sexual abuse allegations involving civilian perpetrators in peacekeeping between 2010 and 2019.
The UN received at least 39 sexual abuse allegations involving civilian perpetrators outside of peacekeeping over just two years, between 2017 and 2018.
An additional 92 allegations involving civilian perpetrators outside of peacekeeping may have involved criminal acts (according to UN data, 8 allegations are of “other forms of sexual violence,” and 84 allegations are classified as “other,” “unknown,” or “TBD”). Data is available only from 2017 to 2019. Not all UN entities report data.
The bottom line is that most civilian sex crimes aren’t referred to criminal justice authorities. The reasons are many—the UN’s refusal to waive immunity of the alleged perpetrator when the Organization’s reputation is on the line, underreporting, the UN’s limited non-criminal investigative capacity, a reluctance on the part of victims to come forward, and the unwillingness of either the host state of a UN mission or the state of nationality of the accused to launch a criminal investigation.
The cases that do get referred are a minuscule percentage of all allegations, and—as OIOS’ evaluation makes jarringly clear—even those that do get referred almost never end in criminal justice.
2) UN refusal to repatriate contingents in line with UNSCR 2272
From the report:
The report states that no peacekeeping contingents have been repatriated since the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2272 in 2016—this despite “credible evidence” that one (unidentified) contingent was implicated in “widespread and systemic” sexual exploitation and abuse. Regarding the contingent in question, the report says that the UN’s Standing Review Committee recommended the repatriation of the 400-troop contingent in July 2018 (a decision that was “endorsed by the leadership of the relevant departments”). The repatriation, the report continues, “did not take place due to political and operational factors including consideration of the corrective actions taken by the TCC [troop-contributing country].” The corrective actions included “several good practices, enhanced communication with the Secretariat and swift enforcement actions resulting in a reduction of allegations of SEA in subsequent years,” according to the report.
Our response:
The report frames the above scenario as a victory. The UN Secretariat engaged with a recalcitrant TCC, which mended its ways. The real issue, however, is that the Secretary-General chose to ignore the recommendations of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2272 and the Standing Review Committee. In several statements and reports, the Code Blue Campaign has shown that Burundi, which sends hundreds of its troops to the UN Peacekeeping Mission in the Central African Republic, remains in flagrant violation of UNSCR 2272. Yet “political and operational factors” keep the Secretariat, and Member States, from ejecting TCCs like Burundi from UN Peacekeeping.
The Standing Review Committee’s recommendation regarding the unnamed TCC has not been mentioned in a public document until this report. The lack of transparency is not surprising, but it remains troubling. What actions did this TCC take? What are the codified standards against which “corrective actions” taken by TCCs are evaluated? We don't know and the UN is staying silent.
3) UN internal administrative justice process is lengthy and nontransparent
From the report:
In peacekeeping, according to the UN’s evaluation, the average time for initial review, reporting, and referral for sexual exploitation and abuse investigation was 34 days while investigations into sexual abuse took an average of 7.8 months to complete, vastly longer than the timelines stipulated by the UN’s guidelines for each.
The standards, according to the report, are as follows: “Critical stipulated timelines for the processing of allegations included 7 days to assess and report on allegations, 3 days for referral for investigation, 10 days (5 days for serious cases) for troop-contributing countries to provide notification of their intention to appoint a National Investigations Officer for cases involving military personnel, 6 months for investigations (3 months for serious cases) and 15 days for submission of an investigation report for further action.”
Those interviewed for the report “largely considered the disciplinary process lengthy and lacking in transparency.” Many interviewees “were not aware of the disciplinary sanctions that were imposed for SEA, which contributed to a perception of impunity,” the report says.
Our response:
Such lengthy internal investigations—conducted by administrative rather than criminal investigators—are devastating impediments to criminal accountability in sexual violence cases, as we outline in greater detail here.
4) Ineffectiveness of Guterres’ key appointees
From the report:
The evaluation exposes Jane Holl Lute, the Secretary-General's Special Coordinator on Improving the UN Response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, as ineffective and disengaged. Her “low visibility” hinders the work of her office, the report finds. Interviewees “expressed expectations of greater visibility and approachability of the Special Coordinator, as well as her actual presence at SEA workgroup meetings where she was officially the chair.” Ms. Lute also serves as the Secretary-General's Special Envoy to Cyprus. “The double-hatting of the Special Coordinator was perceived by some to have contributed to lower visibility of the Office and further diminishing of its resources,” the report says.
Our response:
We have repeatedly highlighted the problematic nature of the “double-hatting” of Ms. Lute, Secretary-General Guterres’ top appointee tasked with responding to the UN’s crisis of sexual exploitation and abuse. Material from the report suggests, again, that her appointment as Special Coordinator is little more than a public relations stunt by Mr. Guterres—part of his attempt to be perceived as serious on the issue of sexual offenses committed by UN personnel.
From the report:
Jane Connors, the UN's Victims’ Rights Advocate, is described in the report as “present, approachable and engaged.” But the report notes that Member States expressed concern with the high cost of her office and lack of tangible results from its work.
Our response:
The problems with Jane Connors and the Office of the Victims' Rights Advocate go beyond the lack of tangible results. We highlighted five fundamental issues in a June 2018 statement:
The VRA is a UN employee, and thus has a conflict of interest when representing victims.
There is no “Victims’ Bill of Rights,” meaning that rights cannot be claimed or transformed into entitlements.
The VRA obscures the UN’s responsibility to cooperate with national jurisdictions in allegations involving civilian personnel. The VRA’s involvement in a case, in other words, can come to represent the totality of the UN’s response to an allegation, when the UN’s priority should in fact be to refer a case to criminal authorities empowered to deliver justice.
The VRA normalizes the use of ad-hoc, voluntary or “ex-gratia” payments and assistance that further downplay legal rights and compensation.
Interacting with the UN VRA can jeopardize future legal claims of the victim.
Our recent analysis of a Jane Connors press conference—during which she spent time commenting on her colleague’s outfit while avoiding answering real questions about the UN’s sex abuse crisis—disputes the notion that the VRA is “present, approachable and engaged.”
5) Ineffectiveness and unsustainability of the Trust Fund
From the report:
The UN Trust Fund in Support of Victims of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse—a central component of Mr. Guterres’ “New Approach”—was “used for community engagement activities while the individual needs of victims remained largely unaddressed,” the report says.
It continues:
“The 12 projects were focused on outreach and support through income generation activities in vulnerable communities in DRC, CAR and Liberia and none focused on direct support to SEA victims … other than in MONUSCO, projects were of indirect relevance to individual needs of SEA victims and did not provide visible support to victims.”
The report reveals that $600,000 has been withheld from TCCs in the wake of substantiated sexual exploitation and abuse allegations but has not yet been transferred to the Fund. The report provides a response from the UN, which states that, as of March 1, "just under" $600,000 has been transferred to the Trust Fund.
Our response:
A trust fund that provides direct compensation to victims of sexual exploitation and abuse could go a long way in helping victims recover from such offenses. But the UN’s Trust Fund is not set up to provide benefits to individual victims. Indeed, the vast majority of those served by Trust Fund projects are not victims of sexual exploitation and abuse. The UN claims in its public relations materials that Trust Fund community projects, such as basket-weaving classes, help “end” and “eliminate” sexual exploitation and abuse.
Such statements run counter to reality. Helping victims after the fact does not make sexual exploitation and abuse any less likely to occur. The projects won’t inspire institutional change, or create the conditions that would encourage victims to report abuse. The projects won't lead to a culture shift that would make bystanders more vocal about offenses they witness, either.
A truly victim-centered approach would provide a range of options for redress. The UN should not be deciding, in a top-down fashion, that all victims desire to learn skills such as basket weaving. The UN’s motivation for the Fund isn’t based on an admission of responsibility. Instead, the UN is conducting an ad-hoc charity operation. The UN could discontinue the Fund at any time without neglecting its responsibility to victims.
In addition, the Trust Fund is unsustainable. Funds withheld from personnel payments of rule-violating TCCs aren’t considerable. Member States have not contributed enough funding to sustain the Fund. Since the Trust Fund is not a budget line item for the UN, there is no guarantee that it will be able to continue.
The ineffectiveness and unsustainability of the Trust Fund makes one thing clear. The Trust Fund is another public relations ploy designed to convince the public that the UN is confronting the ongoing crisis of impunity for sexual exploitation and abuse committed by its personnel.
The report, taken as a whole, makes this point with resounding clarity. The UN is more interested in seeming to confront a problem that worsens with every new allegation and every new scandal. The UN is content with the status quo. And the status quo means that the crisis has no end in sight.
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(UN Photo/Rick Bajornas)